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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARVILLA FINLAYSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Cross-Appellee, 
vs. 
ROGER FINLAYSON, 
Defendant/Appellee, 
Cross-Appellant. 
Case No. 920411-CA 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AND 
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT 
(Consolidated) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Roger Finlayson concurs in the "Statement of the Case" 
as set forth at pages 1 and 2 of the Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1962, two years prior to the parties1 marriage, Roger 
Finlayson borrowed funds from his parents to open a Hallmark store 
in Salt Lake City (R. 577, 578). At that time, Roger executed a 
hand-written promissory note to his father for amounts borrowed 
plus 6% interest, referred to as the "Hallmark Note" (R. 580). The 
amount so loaned was $14,008.54 (R. 579, Finding of Fact 13, at R. 
156) . Roger testified that without the loan, he would not have 
been able to open the store (R. 594) . Roger operated the store 
alone until he married Arvilla in September of 1964 (R. 436). 
When the parties were married in September of 1964, 
Roger's parents allowed the couple to reside in a rental unit owned 
by the parents (R. 585-586). The parties lived there for about 5% 
years (R. 507, 586). While they paid no rent at that time, Roger 
executed another note, payable to his father, in September 1964 
(the month the parties married) , to cover rental amounts at $190 
per month (R. 586-587). Total rental amounts accrued thereunder 
were $2,280 with interest at 6% (R. 589). 
After their marriage, the parties began joint operation 
of the Hallmark Store (R. 722), and continued to do so until the 
store was sold in 1985 (R. 591-592). Proceeds from the sale were 
used to pay off the indebtedness on the marital home (R. 499, 593) , 
and for the parties' general living expenses until 1990 (R. 439). 
At trial, Roger's mother Mina Finlayson, then aged 
ninety-two years, testified that she recalled the circumstance of 
the two Notes, and recognized those documents as being his her 
husband's papers after his death in 1968 (R. 535, 561). She 
expected repayment of those obligations when it was "convenient," 
while recognizing that Roger and Arvilla were suffering financial 
hardships because ". . .they had lost practically everything they 
had gotten from the store." (R. 546). Mina further testified that 
the monies were loans, not gifts, repayment terms were never 
specifically discussed, and that Mina had not forgiven the loans 
(R. 540, 545). 
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Mina also testified that these obligations and their 
repayment were the subject of conversations between Mina and 
Arvilla (R. 541, 546, 729). Arvilla herself admits that these 
conversations took place, and that on one occasion Mina even stated 
a total amount of the Hallmark loan (R. 487-488). Mina 
acknowledged Roger's repayment on those obligations by four 
payments in 1990, and that Mina then bought stocks for herself with 
the money (R. 541-543). 
As a result of the 1988 conversations between Mina and 
Arvilla about the monies owed to Mina, Arvilla admits that she 
began to urge Roger to repay Mina amounts owed (R. 495) . While 
Arvilla did deny that she had personal knowledge of the Rent debts 
(R. 488-489) , she admitted that at one point she asked Roger "Well, 
how much do WE owe your mother?" (R. 432, lines 17-18, emphasis 
added). Arvilla testified that she began to urge Roger to repay 
the debts in 1988, two years before the divorce was initiated, and 
that she continued these exhortations in 1989 and 1990 (R. 496). 
Kurt Finlayson, an adult son of the parties, also 
testified at trial, and stated that he had heard discussions 
between his parents about the debts to Mina, that he heard Arvilla 
encourage repayment to Mina, and that the encouraging became more 
"prevalent" after the Hallmark store was sold (R. 571) . Roger also 
testified that Arvilla's requests to repay Mina were "forceful" and 
"repeated" (R. 610). Just days prior to actual repayment, Roger 
characterized Arvilla's demeanor as "very demanding" as to this 
issue (R. 590-591)• At this time, Roger began to get accurate 
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figures on the total amount owed, and found evidence of his 
father's loan amounts (R. 579, 583). 
Sometime in the 1960's, Roger's parents bought a vacant 
lot next to the Roger and Arvilla's house, with the intent to build 
a home on it, but the death of Roger's father changed those plans 
(R. 550-551) . At trial, Mina stated her belief that she still 
owned the property, but had asked Roger to care for and sell the 
lot (R. 552). Mina engaged her lawyer to take care of the details 
(R. 553). The result (which, by her testimony, Mina obviously did 
not understand), was an outright conveyance to Roger and Arvilla 
jointly, Mina never intended to gift the property to Roger and/or 
Arvilla (R. 555). On cross-examination, she stated that her intent 
was not to transfer ownership, but to enable Roger to "sell it for 
me" (R. 562 line 18), and ". . .if he were going to sell it, he 
would have had the deed." R. 562. At trial, Mina had no present 
recall that the property had been deeded jointly to Roger and 
Arvilla (R. 563). 
The testimony of both Roger and Kurt Finlayson 
corroborated these assertions. Kurt stated that the lot was 
referred to as "grandmother's," which he took to mean Mina (R. 569-
570) . Kurt and Roger both testified that when an offer was made on 
the lot, the two of them went to Mina's house and conveyed the 
offer, which Mina personally rejected as too low (R. 570, 651) . 
Roger further stated that after his father died, Mina did not say 
she was "giving" the lot to Roger, that he gave nothing of value 
for it, and that Mina wanted him only to maintain and sell the lot 
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for her (R.650). Roger testified that he intended only to maintain 
and sell the lot for his mother (R. 650). 
Factual summary of the issues of personal property, 
attorney's fees, and post-trial proceedings are discussed at length 
in Appellant's Brief, and in the Arguments of Appellee and Cross-
Appellant hereinbelow, and shall not be separately set forth at 
this juncture as redundant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARVILLA'S APPEAL: 
POINT I 
The District Court acted well within its broad 
discretion in dividing the assets and debts of the marital estate. 
Arvilla has not shown any manifest inequitable result in the ruling 
below, which held repayment of the "Hallmark Note" chargeable as 
against joint marital assets. Arvilla's knowledge of the debt and 
repeated urging of Roger to repay the debt, coupled with joint 
benefit to the parties attributable to that loan, compel affirmance 
of the District Court's decision. This debt led directly to the 
creation of a tangible and substantial marital asset which both 
parties have enjoyed. Set off of joint debts against marital 
assets has been previously sanctioned by this Court. Arvilla's 
reliance upon the statute of limitations, estoppel and latches are 
misplaced given the evidence at trial and the elements of those 
defenses. 
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POINT II 
The District Court's finding that the vacant lot 
adjacent to the martial residence was not within the martial estate 
is supported by overwhelming evidence in the record below. The 
trial court's finding that the transfer lacked donative intent must 
stand, in that Appellant has not met its burden to marshal evidence 
favorable to this finding. 
POINT III 
The District Court's award of attorney's fees below was 
not made upon a finding of need, but was rather assessed based upon 
Roger's lack of cooperation. The trial court is in a unique 
position to evaluate the reasonableness of fees and the equities 
surrounding the assessment thereof. No abuse of discretion has 
been shown, as the award is supported by the evidence and the 
findings below, and should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
The manner in which the District Court conducted the 
trial resulted in ci fair trial. Arvilla has not articulated the 
basis of her claim nor how the property distribution was 
inequitable. Allegations of "a sleeping judge" are unfounded, and 
are refuted in an examination of the proceedings. The division of 
smaller items of personal property was achieved by stipulation and 
therefore may not be challenged on appeal. 
POINT V 
Since the $500.00 attorney fee award below was assessed 
against Roger on the basis of his lack of cooperation prior to 
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trial, rather than need or ability to pay, previous decisions of 
this Court regarding award of fees on appeal are inapplicable. 
Arvilla has not alleged a change in circumstances since trial, and 
neither party should be awarded fees or costs on appeal. 
ROGER'S CROSS-APPEAL: 
POINT I 
The District Court abused its discretion in failing to 
treat the "Rent Note" in the same equitable manner that it treated 
the "Hallmark Note." Both parties received significant benefit 
from this debt, as well as from the loan to open the Hallmark 
store, even though the "Rent Note" did not result in the creation 
of a tangible marital asset. It was rather a family expense and 
should have been held chargeable against marital assets. This 
ruling resulted in manifest inequity to Roger. The District 
Court's holding that the "Rent Note" alone was subject to the legal 
defense of statute of limitations was a misapplication of law which 
requires reversal and remand on this issue. 
ARGUMENT 
[BRIEF OF APPELLEE] 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ORDERING PAYMENT OF THE 
"HALLMARK NOTE" WITH JOINT MARITAL FUNDS 
In Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992), this 
Court recently summarized the standard by which the trial court's 
property and debt division will be reviewed on appeal. "There is 
no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of properties 
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in a divorce actionL.J" [Citing Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P. 2d 1144, 
1146 (Utah App. 1988)]. "We afford the trial court considerable 
latitude in adjusting financial and property interests, and its 
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity." Id. (emphasis 
added, citations omitted) . "Additionally, we have held that in 
dividing property between the parties in a divorce action, the 
overriding consideration is that the ultimate division be 
equitable." Watson, supra, 837 P.2d 1, 6; (citations omitted). 
Thus the appellant must show that the trial court committed a 
"clear abuse of discretion" to prevail on this issue on before this 
Court. Id. 
An examination of the evidence before the District Court 
reveals that equity compelled a holding that the "Hallmark Note" 
was chargeable against joint marital assets. The funds loaned to 
Roger by his parents were the subject of a written note (R. 580-
582) . Arvilla clearly knew of this obligation, and spoke about it 
on several occasions with Roger, and with Roger's mother Mina 
Finlayson, the sole surviving obligee on the note (R. 487, 488, 
495) . Arvilla encouraged repayment on the parental obligations 
repeatedly throughout the last three years of the marriage (R. 
496) . 
In addition to Arvilla's knowledge of and repeated 
urging to repay the obligation, because the parties1 reaped 
substantial benefit from the loan, equity requires that the parties 
jointly repay the underlying obligation which created that asset. 
The evidence at trial showed that a substantial portion of the 
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marital estate was obtained from the sale of the Hallmark store. 
Both parties acknowledge that the proceeds of that sale paid off 
the mortgage on their home (R. 499, 593), and that the proceeds 
also provided them with their living expenses in the last three 
years of the marriage (R. 439). The District Court found that ". 
. .without this loan from [Roger's] parents, the parties would not 
have had the opportunity to engage in and build the business and 
reap its benefits." Finding of Fact 13, at R. 157. This finding 
is supported by Roger's testimony at R. 594. 
Conversely, it appears that if the District Court had 
ruled otherwise, i.e., that this substantial and tangible benefit 
to both parties, which resulted in the primary asset of the marital 
estate, had not been subject to repayment of the underlying 
obligation, an inequitable result would surely have occurred. Such 
a holding, a result which Arvilla now urges this Court to adopt, 
would have allowed Arvilla to enjoy the full benefit of her share 
of the asset, while leaving all of its attendant burden to Roger. 
Fundamental principals of fairness are mocked by such a result. 
Those who mutually benefit from an asset should be required, in 
equity, to share in its attendant burdens. 
In addressing Arvilla's arguments that the "Hallmark 
Note" should not be chargeable against the marital estate, all 
three "defenses" to the Note are based upon a faulty premise that 
this informal but bona fide debt between close relatives (in this 
case, parents and child) should be judged in the same as context as 
a commercial transaction. This is obviously an inapt analogy. 
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This Court should focus, as the District Court did, on whether the 
debt was real or illusory, the undisputed benefit of the loan to 
the marital estate, and the intent of all parties. Such an inquiry 
reveals the soundness of the District Court's ruling. 
The Brief of Appellant places much reliance on the 
assertion that the note was subject to a legal defense of the 
statute of limitations. It apparently ignores the fundamental 
holdings of Naranio and Watson that this action is one in equity, 
not law, and that this purely legal defense is not properly 
interposed in the present action. 
This Court has previously sanctioned the type of 
distribution made by the District Court in this case. In Rasband 
v. Rasband. 752 P. 2d 1331, 1335, (Utah App. 1988), this court 
affirmed a set off of marital debts against an awarded marital 
asset, finding no abuse of discretion. 
Arvilla's reliance upon the doctrines of laches and 
estoppel are likewise misplaced, but for different reasons. As to 
laches, the facts of this case show that the existence of the debt 
was discussed by all relevant parties years before the divorce. 
Arvilla even stated to Roger at one point "Well, how much do WE owe 
your mother." (R. 432, emphasis added). She repeatedly encouraged 
Roger to repay the debt (R. 496) . 
Arvilla cites the case of Plateau Min. v. Utah Division 
of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990), a contract case, in 
support of her claim of laches. The Court did not invoke laches 
therein because the party seeking to invoke the doctrine had 
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defaulted in its contractual obligation. As the Finlayson accounts 
were jointly controlled by the parties, and each of them made 
withdrawals from the accounts (R. 434, Finding of Fact 9 at R. 
154), Arvilla could have paid the debt herself. Since Arvilla 
clearly perceived the debt as joint, but did nothing, she may not 
now attribute the failure to pay solely to Roger. Her inaction 
places her in pari delicto with Roger. 
Arvillafs reliance on the doctrine of estoppel not only 
fails in elemental proof, but is contrary to the evidence at trial. 
Arvilla must show that her inaction or action was reasonably 
induced by the parents failure to pursue the debt. She has not 
articulated what she did, did not do, nor could have done in 
"reliance" on the parent's "inaction." Thus, estoppel is not 
shown. 
In summary Arvilla's three "defenses" were articulated 
and rejected below. The uncontroverted evidence clearly shows 
Arvilla know of the debt, encouraged repayment, and finally got her 
stated desire. These facts standing alone vitiate all "defenses" 
she now seeks to interpose. 
The District Court heard Mina Finlayson testify that she 
did not demand repayment because Roger and Arvilla were having 
financial difficulty. Arvilla now urges this Court to substitute 
its judgment for that of the trial Judge who heard this evidence, 
and hold that a motherfs forbearance out of compassion for her son 
and daughter-in-law should bar recovery on a debt that was commonly 
and repeatedly discussed, acknowledged, and ultimately repaid at 
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Arvilla's request. Such a result would be manifestly inequitable, 
and the District Court's action should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT THE VACANT 
LOT ADJACENT TO THE MARITAL RESIDENCE WAS 
NOT WITHIN THE MARITAL ESTATE IS SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND IS NOT CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS 
In asking this Court to set aside the findings of the 
District Court relative to inclusion of property within the marital 
estate, the appellant must first "marshal all evidence in support 
of the trial court's finding and then demonstrate that, even 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, 
the evidence is insufficient to support the findings. Watson v. 
Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah App. 1992) (emphasis added), quoting 
Scharf v. BMG Corp,, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah, 1985). The Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure preclude setting aside the trial court's 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous, with the caveat that ". 
. .due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses." U.R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
The Appellant's brief clearly fails to marshal the 
supportive evidence in a meager three paragraphs, but instead but 
uses several citations to the record in an attempt to attack the 
District Court's findings. As this Court held in the Watson case, 
given Appellant's failure to meet that burden to marshal, this 
Court should "assume the record supports the finding, Crouse v. 
Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991), and conclude that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion. . ." Watson, 837 P.2d 
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at 4. The District Court's findings should therefore be affirmed, 
solely upon Appellant's failure to marshal. 
Additionally, Appellant's Brief contains an incorrect 
statement in its citation to the record below in its purported 
"marshalling" section. It asserts at page 26 thereof that: 
16. The fact that Roger was the sole surviving child of his 
mother. (R-716) [sic] 
The Record at page 716 establishes no such sole survivorship, and 
in fact does not address this issue. The existence of another 
surviving sibling to Roger is indeed established at R. 556, line 
17-23. Counsel merely seeks at this juncture to rectify this 
misperception of the record and the actual facts. 
While failure to marshal is fatal to Wife's argument 
herein, and the District Court's finding should be affirmed on that 
basis alone, the record yields abundant evidence upon which the 
District Court made its findings. 
In its ruling from the bench after trial, the District 
Court found that a vacant lot next to the former marital home, 
while nominally titled jointly in the names of the parties, was not 
within the marital estate. This ruling was embodied in the Court's 
oral pronouncement (R. 327) and written Findings of Fact that Mina 
Finlayson's 1978 transfer of title was not made with donative 
intent, but was deeded to the parties merely as trustees for 
maintenance and sale of the property. Finding of Fact 12, at R. 
155-156. Both findings are supported by substantial evidence in 
the record below: 
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Mina Finlayson testified that she believed she still 
owned the lot at the time of trial (R. 552). 
Mina and her husband bought the lot decades ago to build 
on but the husband died prior to building (R. 550-551) . 
Mina decided to sell the lot when her husband died, and 
asked her son Roger to maintain and sell the lot for her 
(R. 552) • 
Mina asked her lawyer to take care of the details of 
authorizing Roger to sell the lot (R. 553). 
Mina did not understand that the property had been 
transferred jointly to Roger and Arvilla (R. 563) . 
Mina's intent at the time of transfer was so that Roger 
could "sell it for me" (R. 562). 
Mina never intended to gift the lot to Roger and/or 
Arvilla (R. 555). 
Roger testified that at the time of the transfer Mina 
wanted him to maintain and sell the property for her, 
that Mina never said she was giving the property to him, 
and that he gave nothing in exchange for the property 
(R. 650). 
Kurt Finlayson, an adult child of the parties, testified 
that the lot was referred to as "grandmothers" (R. 570) , 
and that he understood that to mean Mina Finlayson 
(R.571). 
Roger and Kurt both testified that when an offer was 
received on the property, Roger personally conveyed the 
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offer to Mina, and she rejected it as too low (R. 570, 
651). After the transfer of title Roger's sole intent 
was to maintain and sell the lot on behalf of his mother 
(R. 652). 
11. Mina was ninety-two years old at the time of trial (R. 
534) . 
The above summarized evidence at trial clearly support 
the District Courtfs findings that the vacant lot was not conveyed 
by Mina with donative intent, and was therefore not within the 
marital estate. The only evidence contrary to these findings came 
from Arvilla herself. After hearing all of the evidence on this 
issue, the District Court obviously chose to accept the testimony 
of Mina, Roger and Kurt, and disregard the limited testimony of 
Arvilla. 
Given Appellant's failure to marshal, and the abundant 
evidence supporting the District Court's finding, said finding must 
remain undisturbed. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ASSESSMENT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
A trial court has the power to award attorney fees in 
divorce proceedings, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3. The 
decision to make such an award and the amount thereof rests 
primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. However the 
award must be based on evidence of both financial need and 
reasonableness. Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah App. 
1988) (citations omitted). Awards will be reversed only if they 
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constitute an abuse of discretion, or if the award is not supported 
by adequate findings. Id. at 1336; Bell v. Bell, 810 P. 2d 489, 494 
(Utah App. 1991). 
The District Court specifically rejected requests for 
the award of attorney's fees based upon need. This ruling is 
soundly based in the evidence at trial. The Court found that Roger 
was then unemployed and that Arvilla had part-time employment 
(Finding of Fact 6 at R. 151). At trial Arvilla admitted making a 
$19,000.00 cash loan to her son at the outset of the divorce (R. 
435, 503), and to taking a trip to Hawaii during the course of the 
proceedings (R. 503). The record is replete with references to 
additional and substantial assets owned by the parties, including 
the unencumbered marital home. 
In its pronouncement of ruling, the Court found that 
each party had assets and recourse to pay their own attorneys (R. 
351). Thus the Court rejected need-based awards of attorney's 
fees. 
The Court went on in its pronouncement of ruling to 
order Roger to pay $500.00 in Arvilla's attorney's fees. The Court 
assessed this amount based upon Roger's lack of cooperation prior 
to trial. While Appellant contends in its Brief at page 29 that 
Roger admitted only he had been "hard headed," a review of 
Appellant's citation of the transcript reveals Roger thought both 
parties had been hard headed. 
In its ruling, the Court obviously considered the 
demeanor of both parties, the presentations of counsel, and 
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assessed compensatory attorney's fees based upon the vigorously 
contested proceedings before it. It should be noted that Arvilla's 
requests for citation of contempt were denied by the Court. The 
trial court is in a unique position to evaluate which fees are 
reasonable and necessary, and assess any such amounts in its sound 
discretion. 
In deference to the District Court's determinations 
after trial, and evidence of substantial assets of both parties, 
the award of attorney's fees should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE CONDUCTED IN A 
MANNER WHICH RESULTED IN A FAIR TRIAL AS TO 
ALL PARTIES, AND WERE NOT ARBITRARY 
Arvilla claims that the trial proceedings as conducted 
by Senior Judge Wahlquist denied her a fair trial. Among her 
allegations are that the Judge was sleeping, that he acted in an 
arbitrary manner, and that he was flippant about dividing up 
thousands of pieces of minor personal items. Roger concedes that 
the monumental task of dividing thousands of items with nominal 
value may have frustrated the Court. These assertions are 
insufficient to warrant either a reversal or new trial. 
Initially, these arguments suffer from the same 
infirmity noted by this Court's unanimous opinion, per Judge 
Billings in Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991). In 
that case, the wife claimed that the trial court failed to 
accurately account for and value the marital property and that 
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therefore the court's property distribution was inequitable. 
Accordingly this Court held there, as it should in this case: 
Wife does not articulate the basis of her 
claim that the court's property distribution 
was inequitable. She does not explain what 
property she believes should have been 
awarded to her or how the court abused its 
discretion. Therefore, we affirm the 
property distribution. Id. 
These purported deficiencies weire raised in Arvilla's 
motion for new trial, which was denied by Memorandum Decision of 
Judge Wahlquist (drafted by the Court itself) and entered May 19, 
1992 (R. 288-297). The Memorandum Decision, reproduced in 
Appellant's Brief at A-55 through A-64, is articulate and 
demonstrates that the Court understood the issues and testimony at 
trial, and provides insight on the Court's attentive nature. As 
the Memorandum Decision was authored almost seven months after the 
trial, Judge Wahlquist may have been off on some details, but 
clearly demonstrates his grasp of the proceedings. 
Judge Wahlquist also pronounced his ruling immediately 
from the bench after trial. A copy of that transcript appears at 
Brief of Appellant Appendix A-l through A-33. The Court ruled on 
every issue before it, appeared lucid, clarified its ruling at 
counsels' request, and finally asked if further issues remained 
undisposed of, to which the parties both replied in the negative. 
No credible evidence exists in the record that Judge Wahlquist 
slept through this trial, and all appearances are that he did not. 
Arvilla challenges the division of personal property as 
arbitrary and capricious. The record below indicates that Judge 
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Wahlquist assigned values and awarded each of the parties numerous 
items with substantial value. Arvilla does not claim that these 
values are without foundation in the record, but rather that when 
it got down to thousands of smaller items, Judge Wahlquist's 
suggestion of division by alternate choice beginning with a coin 
toss was improper. It should be noted that no such coin toss took 
place during the trial, in that the Court took a recess after which 
the parties agreed to meet at the residence and divide by 
stipulation (R. 338). 
The record after trial indicates minor personal property 
was in fact divided by agreement. In post trial proceedings, 
Arvilla filed an Affidavit, (reproduced in its entirety in the 
Appendix hereto, and found at R. 232-239A), which details the 
division by agreement that took place in November of 1991. It 
specifically references alternate choice by the parties, and was 
sanctioned by attorneys for both Arvilla and Roger, who were 
present for the division (R. 235-236). As such, Arvilla has no 
basis upon which to challenge this purported impropriety. Thus, 
even if the District Court deportment is deemed inappropriate, no 
prejudicial error resulted. 
POINT V 
NEITHER PARTY SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S 
FEES NOR COSTS ON APPEAL, IN THAT THE 
DISTRICT COURT DID NOT BASE THE $500 AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES BELOW BASED UPON A 
FINDING OF NEED 
As discussed above, the District Court did not award 
attorney's fees below on a basis of need, but rather upon the 
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conclusion that Rocjer had not been cooperative prior to trial. 
Since those considerations are not at play in the instant appeal, 
they do not constitute a basis for award of attorney's fees on 
appeal. Thus, Appellant's reliance on Crouse v. Crouse in its 
brief is misplaced. 
No allegation is made that the appeals nor defense of 
those appeals are frivolous. To the contrary, it appears that the 
parties have a substantial and bona fide dispute as to the judgment 
of the District Court. 
Arvilla has not put forth any allegation that the 
financial circumstances of the parties have changed since the trial 
of this matter. Based upon the findings of the District Court, 
this Court should not award either party their costs nor attorney's 
fees on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
[BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT] 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO ORDER REPAYMENT OF THE "RENT 
NOTE" FROM JOINT MARITAL FUNDS 
As more fully set forth in Point I of the Brief of 
Appellee above, the standard for appellate review of the District 
Court's ruling on issues of property and debt distribution of the 
marital estate is one of abuse of discretion. While the District 
Court is afforded considerable latitude in adjusting these 
interests, and its actions enjoy a presumption of validity, this 
Court may set aside such determinations if it can be shown that 
there was a misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
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prejudicial error, or if such a serious inequity has resulted as to 
manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 
1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988) cited with approval in Watson v. 
Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1992). In this cross-appeal, 
Roger Finlayson contends that just such a serious inequity has 
resulted by the District Court's refusal to order repayment of the 
"Rent Note" with joint marital funds. 
Roger asserts that the District Court treated the 
"Hallmark Note" in an equitable manner by ordering its repayment 
with joint marital funds, as detailed in Point I of the Brief of 
Appellee, supra. Roger concedes that such treatment of the 
"Hallmark Note" is in a somewhat stronger position due that debt's 
creation of a tangible asset, and the "benefits/burdens" analysis 
set forth therein. Roger now argues that even though the "Rent 
Note" created no tangible marital asset, it too should have been 
ordered repaid with joint marital funds. The basis herefor is that 
the underlying expenditure was clearly a family necessity 
expenditure (housing) , was within Arvilla's knowledge, and was also 
the subject of repeated discussions of repayment. 
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-9 support 
Roger's contention that the "Rent Note" is chargeable against the 
marital estate. It provides: 
Family expenses — Joint and several 
liability. 
The expenses of the family and the education 
of the children are chargeable upon the 
property of both husband and wife or of 
either of them, and in relation thereto they 
may be sued jointly or separately. 
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As housing is clearly a family expense, the plain language of this 
statute requires that the "Rent Note", once determined to be bona 
fide, is chargeable against the marital estate. 
As set forth above, in Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 
1331, 1335, (Utah App. 1988), this Court affirmed a set off of 
marital debts against an awarded asset, finding no abuse of 
discretion. Having established that such a process of equalization 
is permissible, Roger argues that the "Rent Note" should have been 
treated in the same manner as the "Hallmark Note." 
The testimony at trial makes little differentiation as 
to the two Notes, but references are largely to the "debt" alone. 
It is undisputed that Arvilla and Roger obtained joint value 
(housing) under the obligation. Apparently the District Court also 
found the "Rent Note" to be bona fide in both its pronouncement of 
ruling (R. 328) and Finding of Fact #13 at R. 158. The Court ruled 
that this Note was not chargeable to the assets of the marital 
estate under alternative doctrines of Statute of Limitation, 
estoppel, and waiver. Roger argues that such a ruling is a 
misapplication of law, and constitutes an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion. 
As set forth above, the legal bar of the statute of 
limitations is inapplicable in this case of equity. There is 
further evidence of novation and extension in the record below. 
Estoppel is also not at play due to Arvilla's admitted knowledge of 
the debt to Roger's parents, her adoption of them as joint debts, 
and her encouragements to repay. 
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In short, there appears no substantial reason to treat 
the "Hallmark Note1 and the "Rent Note" in a different manner, as 
equity requires consistency of treatment. At no time did Arvilla 
assert that she believed that the parties resided in the parents' 
rental property for free. It is undisputed that both parties 
received substantial benefit from Roger's parents, in a time of 
great need. In equity, both should be ordered to equally 
contribute to discharge this debt from joint marital assets. 
Due to its disparate treatment of these two acknowledged 
bona fide debts, which each imparted joint benefit to the parties, 
the ruling of the District Court as to the "Rent Note" should be 
reversed as an abuse of its discretion. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The District properly held the "Hallmark Note" to be 
chargeable against the assets of the marital estate, but abused its 
discretion in refusing to treat the "Rental Note" in the same 
manner. The District Court's finding that the vacant lot was not 
within the marital estate is clearly supported by the evidence at 
trial. The personal property distribution was equitable, and 
appears to have been achieved in part by the Judge's valuations and 
awards, and further by stipulated division. The District Court's 
award of attorney's fees is not an abuse of discretion because both 
parties had financial resources, and each had large attorney's 
fees. As such, no costs or attorney's fees should be awarded on 
appeal. The District Court did abuse its discretion in failing to 
charge the "Rent Note" against marital assets. 
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Accordingly, Roger Finlayson seeks the following relief 
on appeal: 
1. Affirmance of the District Court's ruling that the 
"Hallmark Note" should be paid with joint marital funds, in that 
the same was not an abuse of discretion. 
2. Leaving undisturbed the District Court's finding 
that the vacant lot adjacent to the former marital home was not 
within the marital estate, as said finding is fully supported by 
the evidence. 
3. Affirmance of the District Court's award of 
attorney's fees below, and further ordering that each party bear 
their costs and fees incurred on appeal. 
4. An order vacating the District Court's ruling that 
the "Rent Note" was not a joint debt properly chargeable against 
the marital assets, as an abuse of its discretion, and directing 
the District Court on remand to enter judgment in favor of Roger 
and against Arvilla for one-half of the total principal amount of 
$2,280.00 (plus simple interest at 6%) due Mina Finlayson on the 
"Rent Note." / 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this V day of February, 1993. 
WILLIAM R. RUSSELL 
Attorney for Roger Finlayson 
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Of I hereby certify that on the U day of February, 
1993, I served the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND BRIEF OF CROSS-
APPELLANT (Consolidated) by mailing 2 copies thereof to: 
SHARON A. DONOVAN, ESQ. 
KENT M. KASTING, ESQ. 
SHANNON W. CLARK, ESQ. 
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SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901) 
SHANNON W. CLARK (5678) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 
Telephone: (801) 521-63 83 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
ARVILLA FINLAYSON, : PLAINTIFF'S COUNTER AFFIDAVIT 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : Civil No. D90-5062 
ROGER FINLAYSON, : 
Defendant. : Honorable Timothy R. Hansen 
oOo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Arvilla Finlayson, after being 
first duly sworn upon oath, and deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled matter. 
2. I have personal knowledge concerning the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the matters set forth below. 
3. In response to Paragraph 3 of Defendant's Affidavit, 
when I first initiated this divorce, in December, 1990, I was 
forced to seek the assistance of the Court in having defendant 
removed from the home because he had been loading up our marital 
^ ^ ^ 
property and secreting it away. Defendant did have the opportunity 
to say goodbye to his daughter and, in fact, went to her school and 
told her that I was going to send her father to jail. 
4. In response to Paragraph 5 of Defendant's Affidavit, 
On February 1, 1991, both defendant and I and both our attorneys 
were present at the marital residence. Up until that time, I had 
been living in the home and had been ordered to allow defendant and 
Trisha to move back into the home February 2nd or 3rd, 1991. When 
all parties and attorneys were present, I had moved all of my 
personal belongings and minimal items to set up housekeeping into 
the center of the living room and in the family room so defendant 
could observe the items I was removing. I had also inventoried all 
significant items of property in the entire home. On February 1st, 
all parties and attorneys had the opportunity to review and approve 
my inventory lists as well as every item of property I was planning 
to remove to set up an apartment. I removed no sealed boxes from 
the home. In fact, both my attorney and defendant's attorney 
assisted me in removing the items from the home and into the 
driveway on February 1, 1991. Since that day, I have not removed 
any items of property except for those that have been specifically 
divided and agreed upon between defendant and I. 
5. In response to Paragraph 6 of Defendant's Affidavit, 
when I turned over the marital residence to defendant in February, 
1991, there were no items of property broken or destroyed. I see 
no reference to any broken items on defendant's property list. 
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6. In response to Paragraph 7 or Defendant's Affidavit*, 
I categorically deny that I have hidden any marital property or 
taken any items without prior agreement or approval. I have been 
forthright and honest in my actions and dealing with defendant 
throughout the divorce. 
7. In response to Paragraph 8 of Defendant's Affidavit, 
it is true that with attorneys present we divided many of the 
larger items of personal property. It was then necessary for 
defendant and I alone to divide the remainder of the smaller items. 
I never redivided what had already been designated as defendant's. 
It has been necessary to continue to set up times to divide the 
property due to defendant's inability to work on the division for 
longer than several hours at a time. 
8. In response to Paragraph 9 of Defendant's Affidavit, 
I understood that I was to begin paying child support in January, 
1992. I have paid $102.50 for January, February and March for a 
total of $307.50. 
9. In response to Paragraph 10 of Defendant's 
Affidavit, I agree to entering into an agreement to pay one-half of 
the cost of counseling. The Court ordered we share the cost, and 
I have been the one trying to set up such counseling. 
10. In response to Paragraph 11 of Defendant's 
Affidavit, I have not received any checks for the Thrift 
Liquidator. I have provided a copy of the total amount to be 
divided to defendant's counsel. It is my understanding that this 
amount is to be divided in July, 1992. Attached as Exhibit "A" is 
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a copy of a disbursement from Thrift Liquidation that defendant 
has, to this day, not divided nor acknowledged. I only have notice 
of this check directly through the liquidators. 
11. In response to Paragraph 12, of Defendant's 
Affidavit, I have been paying rent for the past year and defendant 
has been living in the home without making any monthly payment. It 
is only fair and reasonable that he be ordered to pay the tax and 
insurance for the year he resided in the residence. I earn $5.42 
per hour for a monthly net of approximately $325.15 minus my child 
support obligation of $102.50 for a total of $222.65 to meet my 
monthly living expenses. In addition, I am attending Salt Lake 
Community College full time. Clearly, I have no monies to pay 
taxes, insurance, or repairs on the residence. Defendant complains 
of lack of resources to make repairs, however, he has not even made 
the simplest, most minor repairs. In addition, he has had the 
resources to obtain new furniture in the home to replace the items 
I was awarded. For example, defendant has obtained two reclining 
chairs in the front room and some furniture for Trisha. 
12. In response to defendant's list of items "missing 
from the house11, the following are just examples of my responses to 
some of the items on defendant's list: 
a. The motor home was basically cleaned out by the 
time defendant and I began dividing the property in November, 1991, 
after the divorce trial. I had not been in the motor home for over 
eight months when I discovered the numerous items missing out of 
the motor home. 
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b. The sewing machine cabinet was mine prior tfb 
marriage and I have it in my possession. 
c. The oriental rug was divided when the parties 
and attorneys were present in November, 1991, and I received the 
rug and defendant received the freezer in exchange. (See 
Exhibit ftBlf, which is plaintifffs attorney, Shannon W. Clark's 
notes taken on November 27, 1991, regarding the division of 
personal property. The "A" notes that plaintiff selected the item 
the lfRff notes that defendant selected the item. As the notes 
reflect, Roger had selected the Rug and Arvilla had selected the 
Freezer, then the parties made a switch.) 
d. The keyboard was also divided when attorneys 
and parties were present in November, 1991. (See Exhibit "B") . 
e. The canister vacuum listed was awarded to 
plaintiff in exchange for the upright that defendant had in his 
possession. 
f. During the division in November, 1991, I 
specifically asked defendant where the chain saw was. He replied 
that Kurt must have borrowed it. 
q. Regarding the tool box, when I moved out of the 
house in February, 1991, defendant agreed, upon the advice of his 
attorney, to allow me to have the small ammunition box of tools 
that was taken out of the motor home so that I could set up an 
apartment. 
13. In response to Paragraph 4 of Defendant's Counter 
Affidavit, I refused to re-sign the listing agreement with Eager 
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because they had indicated to me that defendant was not cooperating 
in the sale and then later indicated they were unwilling to 
document defendant's actions to frustrate the sale because they did 
not want to further anger or alienate defendant. Eager was also 
unwilling to move the "For Sale" sign to a more visible location. 
14. In response to paragraph 6 of Defendant's Counter 
Affidavit, during the marriage we kept all our important documents 
in the family safe. I was never allowed to have the combination to 
the safe. When the attorneys and defendant and I inventoried the 
home in February, 1991, the safe was empty. I believe defendant 
removed these documents just prior to my filing for divorce. I 
have never removed any of these documents. I never had access to 
them. 
15. In response to paragraph 9 of Defendant1 Counter 
Affidavit, after I left the marital residence in February, 1991, 
defendant had sole use and possession of the motor home. In fact, 
he took several trips in it in the spring and summer of 1991. I 
offered to sell the motor home to defendant after the divorce trial 
and he said "No". As far as I am aware, defendant has not filed 
any type of police report of claim on insurance for the damage to 
the vehicle. Our son, Kurt, informed me that Trisha told him that 
she observed defendant putting sugar in the motor home gas tank. 
I deny I was in any way involved in the damage to the vehicle. I 
had the motor home removed from the residence in mid-March to have 
it repaired and sold. Defendant should be responsible for the 
cost of the motor home repair. 
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DATED this 7 day of April, 1992 
ARVILLA FINLA 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary 
Public, this (-]' day of April, 1992 
MM 
— -M- NOTARY PUBLIC 
m mm mm mm mm mm — — 
Notary Public L I IRENE M.CLARK I 
310 South Mrin St £130 I 
Salt Lake Citv, Utr'i ^ 1 0 1 . 
My Commissicn Expires I 
November 12,1995 I 
State of Utah J 
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